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The fact remains, however, that if Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act creates a federal substantive labor policy against the issuance of injunc-
tions, it should be binding on the state courts. If it is simply a jurisdictional
limitation on the federal courts it should not be binding." The better ap-
proach, it appears, would be to consider the Norris-LaGuardia Act a jurisdic-
tional statute and allow the states to maintain their right to issue injunctions.
Congress intended the act to apply only to the federal courts. It would have
specifically stated otherwise if it had intended the states to be bound by the
act.°5 In general, the reasons behind this point of view as set out above are
the more convincing.
Therefore, if the states possess the power to issue a no-strike injunction,
the right to remove must be denied. If not, the right to this state enforce-
ment would be in name only and ineffective since removal of the action would
always preclude its use. Since the majority of the federal courts now refuse
to grant a motion for removal under the conditions of the case at hand, this
should continue to be the policy."
In conclusion, it appears that the federal courts do not have the power
to entertain an action for removal which seeks a no-strike injunction. The
action should be remanded to the state court. Further, all of these actions for
violation of collective bargaining agreements should be considered to have
arisen under Section 301(a) of the LMRA and the federal substantive labor
law should be applied by the states in enforcing these actions. However, since
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not part of the federal substantive law, but rather
is jurisdictional, the states need not apply this law but may issue injunctions
to enforce no-strike agreements.
If the United States Supreme Court should ultimately resolve the issue,
the following holding might be anticipated. State courts must apply federal
labor law and policy in enforcing collective bargaining agreements, but re-
tain the power to issue the no-strike injunction. Further, the federal district
courts are unable to grant removal of actions in which no-strike injunctions
are sought.
MATTHEW T. CONNOLLY
Trade Regulation—Price Discrimination—Meaning of "Like Grade and
Quality" Under Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act—Borden
Co. v. FTC. 1—The Borden Company manufactures and distributes dairy
products and sells both the Borden brand and private label brand evaporated
milk. Although chemically identical and similarly packed, except for the
64 See Comment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 354, 364-68 (1958).
65 The Court in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 204 (1962), stated that
"if Congress had intended that § 301 suits should also not be subject to the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it . . . would have made its intent known in this
same express manner." This argument can also apply to the fact that had they intended
the states to be bound by the act they would have specifically made their intent known.
64 See cases cited supra note 9.
1 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
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label, the Borden brand has a proven customer preference and commands
a higher price at both wholesale and retail levels. Many wholesalers buy
both types of milk from Borden, treating the Borden brand as a premium
line. Uniform throughout the country, Borden's price substantially exceeds
that of the private label brand, which is sold on a cost-plus basis. Section 2
(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act2 makes it unlawful to discriminate in price
between purchasers of commodities of "like grade and quality." The FTC
attacked the difference in price between the Borden brand and the private
brand. The issue was whether "demonstrated consumer preference" should
be considered to show unlikeness of grade or quality of products otherwise
similar and thus remove the price differential from the restraint of the
statute. The Hearing Examiner found the goods were of like grade and
quality but dismissed the petition on other grounds.`' The Commission re-
versed,' ordering Borden to end the price difference. On appeal, HELD: The
products were not of like grade and quality since demonstrated consumer
preference made them sufficiently unlike to take the price difference out of
the Robinson-Patman prohibition.
Curbs on price discrimination can be traced to the Interstate Commerce
Act.' This legislation was principally aimed at railroads, but regulation of
price discrimination was extended to private, non-monopolistic enterprise by
the Clayton Act.e The Robinson-Patman Act reiterated and extended the
Clayton Act, emphasizing protection of the independent merchant. The
reason for Robinson-Patman was the advent of the chain store.? Because of
the size and economic power of the chains, the proponents of Robinson-
Patman felt that the chain stores could force producers to sell to them at
prices lower than those offered to the independent. 8 Thus, the purpose of
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (Supp. V, 1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered.
a Borden Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, FTC Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations) lj 15634 (1961). The Hearing Examiner felt there was adequate cost
justification and no injury to competition.
4 Borden Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (Trade Reg. Rep, Tr. Binder, FTC Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations) 	 16191 (1962).
24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
7 80 Cong. Rec. 8130 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Robsion) ; Rowe, Evolution of the
Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1059, 1061 (1957)
8 80 Cong. Rec. 8111 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Patman) •
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Robinson-Patman was to strengthen the Clayton Acta and to provide equal
opportunity for the independent." The concept of like grade and quality
with respect to interstate commercial transportation was found in the Inter-
state Commerce Act" but was not formalized in terms until the Clayton
Act." Robinson-Patman then shifted a showing of like grade and quality
from a defense to an essential element of the charge."
The FTC and the courts have fixed on various tests in determining like
grade and quality. Most widely used is the physical composition test, that is,
if the goods are of identical physical composition, they are of like grade and
quality." Until the instant case, courts have given no weight to different
labelling without physical differences." Thus, on facts similar to those of the
instant case," the FTC found that tires produced by Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., and sold under the Goodyear label and a private merchandiser's
label were of like grade and quality. The physical composition test has like-
wise been used to find that goods are of unlike grade and quality." Minor
variations in leather and workmanship caused such a finding in Boss Mfg.
Co. v. Payne Glove Co.'s Inconsistent interpretations, however, have resulted
from this test in that minor physical variations have also been passed over,
and the goods found of like grade and quality."
Another test occasionally used to find products of like grade and quality
is functional interchangeability.'" If the goods perform the same function,
they are held to be of like grade and quality. Thus, in McWhirter v. Monroe
Calculating Mach. Co., 21
 computing machines that differed in appearance
but had the same basic components were ruled to be of like grade and
quality because they performed similar functions. So also in Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co.,22
 containers that were of the same composition
and differed only in specifications were found to be of similar grade and
quality because of their functional interchangeability.
9 United States v, National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34 (1963).
10
 80 Cong. Rec. 8133 (1936) (statement from Report of Committee on the Judi-
ciary).
11
 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1958) ("a like and contempora-
neous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic. .. .")
12
 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. V, 1964) ("nothing
herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities
on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity...M.
13 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
14 See United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) ; Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658
(1940) ; United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
15 See Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953) ; Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303
(1938).
19
 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 101
F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939).
17 See cases collected in 81 Cong. Rec. App. 2336-2441 (1937).
18 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934).
19 General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
20 Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications under the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 450, 465 (1948).
21 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
22 87 F. Supp, 985 (S.D. Fla, 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir,), modified, 190
F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951).
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A third possible test is commercial fungibility. To be of like grade and
quality the goods would have to be fungible, that is, the customer would
show no preference for one or the other at the same price 2 3 This approach
is strikingly pointed out in dictum in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Amana Refrigeration,
Although no two programs present the same artistic, educational
or entertainment value to all persons it may well be that so-called
prime time programs which have demonstrated comparable audience
drawing power would be of like grade and quality from a com-
mercial standpoint to prospective sponsor-advertisers. 25
The minority members of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws" favored a somewhat similar test, calling only for
consideration of consumer brand-preferences in deciding grade and quality
within the broad framework of the physical or functional tests. The in-
fluence of consumer preference on like grade and quality has also been recog-
nized in denying defenses of "meeting competition" under Section 2 (b) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. 27 This means that a producer of a premium prod-
uct cannot use this defense if he lowers his price to that of his non-premium
competitor, since he has thereby more than met competition.
It has been contended that the statutory words—"like grade and quality"
—are sufficiently broad to cover economic considerations.25 That people prefer
a brand over an identical private label product, even at an increase in price,
is well acknowledged. 2° Much time and effort is spent in creating a demand
for brand products. Thus, it has been said that goods can become different
when wrapped in different packages." This is especially true with regard to a
wholesaler whose sole purpose is resale and whose only yardstick is price.
It would be easy to overestimate the significance of the instant case. Its
application is limited to instances where there is "demonstrated consumer
preference."" Where this is not present, the traditional tests will continue to
be determinative. An important question raised by the case, however, is
whether consumer preference controls the determination of like grade and
quality or is merely contributory. If consumer preference is controlling, the
case seems close to the commercial fungibility approach. 32 If, however, com-
mercial significance is merely contributory to the finding and is to be con-
sidered along with physical and functional identity, the case is more in
23 Rowe, Price Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.8 (1962).
24 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961).
25 Id. at 378.
26 Att'y Gen, Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 158 (1955).
27 Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 16800 (1964).
28 Rowe, Price Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, supra note 23.
22 Cassady Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" within
the Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 241,
256-73 (1957).
30 Mayer, The Big Invisible Sell, Saturday Evening Post, March 13, 1965, 23, 27
(". . . good advertising gives people a 'reason why' (to buy a product), An established
brand name is itself a 'reason why' . . ."),
31 Borden Co. v. FTC, supra note 1 , at 136.
82 Rowe, Price Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, supra note 23.
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accord with the minority view of the Attorney General's Committee. 33 In
either alternative, this appears to be the first complete recognition of con-
sumer preference in determining grade and quality under section 2(a). By
postulating that consumer preference should be considered under like grade
and quality, the court implicitly rejected Commission dictum 34 and the
proposals of the Attorney General's Committee" that consumer preference
might more properly be considered under cost justification or injury to
competition."
One of the underlying reasons for the physical composition test was its
simplicity and definiteness of application. 37 The proper determination could
be made quickly and conclusively, especially in the food products line. The
test postulated by the instant case, however, might be cumbersome and ex-
pensive to employ. Nor has the court specified the manner or extent of proof
required. What are the means of showing "demonstrated consumer prefer-
ence?" In the instant case, testimony of retailers and wholesalers was used. It
appears equally valid, however, to employ rating services, consumer reports,
or even testimony of consumers."
A more important problem is the quantum of proof required: must con-
sumer preference be national or merely in the locality of the sale; for how
Iong a time must the consumer preference exist; do mere numbers con-
stitute consumer preference or can it exist if only a minority choose the
product?
The instant case presents the further issue of burden of proof. Tradi-
tionally, a showing of like grade and quality has been an element of com-
plainant's case." Thus, if consumer preference is to be a legal test for like
grade and quality, the complainant would be compelled to bear the burden
of proving its existence. Language in the instant case, however, indicates that
the defendant would bear the burden of proof on consumer preference." This
is a more reasonable allocation since evidence as to price, popular appeal,
extent of advertising, etc. is far more readily available to a defendant. To
place such a burden on the FTC would hamper otherwise legitimate
investigations.
The complex proof problems involved in showing consumer preference
prompted the Attorney General's Committee to reject consumer preference as
a test for grade and quality. The majority felt that
abandonment of a physical test of grade and quality in favor of a
marketing comparison of intrinsically identical goods might not
only enmesh the administrators of the statute in complex economic
33 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., supra note 26.
34
 Borden Co., supra note 4, at 	 21,019.
Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., supra note 26.
38
 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
37 See Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., supra note 26.
38 Such evidence is used effectively to establish secondary meaning for trademark
registration. Pattishall, Secondary Meaning in Trade Identity Cases: Some Questions and
Suggested Answers, 45 Trademark Rep. 1261 (1955).
89 General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 890 (1954).




investigations for every price discrimination charge, but also could
encourage easy evasion of the statute through artificial variations in
the packaging, advertising or design of goods which the seller wishes
to distribute at differential prices.'"
This warning still stands.
JAMES P. DOHONEY
41
 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., supra note 26, at 158-59.
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